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SHOPPING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY LAW INTHE EU
NICOLAS RENNUY*
Abstract
This article explores the extent to which EU law does and should enable
undertakings to control whichMember State’s contribution rate applies to
them. By relying on posted workers, for example, undertakings can
“shop” for the cheapest social security law, lowering their labour costs;
this is, however, to the detriment of workers, competitors, and social
security systems. The article seeks to determine when conflict rules
excessively facilitate law shopping. It then discusses how legislators and
courts can complicate law shopping by framing it as abuse, redesigning
rules, interpreting them teleologically, and improving their enforcement.
1. Introduction
That “[f]irms can and do ‘regime shop’ for the lowest percentage of social
security contributions”1 is vividly illustrated by a recent judgment of the
Grand Chamber of the ECJ.2 AFMB is a Cypriot company offering transport
undertakings savings to the tune of 25 percent of their staff costs. It hired
international long-distance lorry drivers crisscrossing Europe and made them
fully available to a number of Dutch transport undertakings, by whom those
same drivers used to be employed directly. While the drivers’work routine was
largely or wholly unaffected, their legal position changed significantly: they
shifted from Dutch to Cypriot social security law because their employer
was no longer in the Netherlands, but in Cyprus. This operation lowered
labour costs, given the difference between the Dutch and Cypriot social
security contribution rates. It was not a one-off experiment. Rather, this type
of construction is part of the core business ofAFMB, which it advertised on its
website even after the ECJ negated the attempt to choose Cypriot law by
* Lecturer at York Law School, University of York. This article was awarded the 2020
Common Market Law Review Prize for Young Academics.
1. Cremers, “Market integration, cross-border recruitment, and enforcement of labour
standards – A Dutch case” in Arnholtz and Lillie (Eds.), Posted Work in the European Union:
The Political Economy of Free Movement (Routledge, 2020), p. 140.
2. Case C-610/18, AFMB v. Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank,
EU:C:2020:565.
Common Market Law Review 58: 13–38, 2021.
© 2021 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
finding that the Dutch transport undertakings remained the actual employers
of the drivers.
Whether Dutch or Cypriot social security law applies has a profound
impact on various actors. It determines the contribution burden of the
undertakings involved, and therefore their competitive position vis-à-vis their
competitors. The stakes can be high, considering that the social security
contribution rates for employers vary widely between Member States. On
average, the nine Member States with the highest rate levy 23 percent of gross
wages from employers; the nine Member States with the lowest rate only 8
percent.3 The applicable law also defines the rights (i.e. benefits) and
obligations (e.g. contributions) of workers. AFMB attempted to subject
drivers to the social security system of Cyprus, where they had never worked
or lived, and to bar them from the more protective social security schemes of
the Netherlands, where they resided. Finally, the question of which law applies
affects the expenditure and revenue of both the chosen Member State, Cyprus,
and the circumvented Member State, the Netherlands.
This article addresses three questions that such scenarios raise. First, to
what extent can undertakings control the applicable social security law?
Employer and employee cannot contractually agree that the law of one
particular State will apply – there is no direct choice of law. Instead,
Regulation 883/2004 identifies the applicable social security law exclusively
on the basis of objective connecting factors, such as the place of work or the
place of the employer’s registered office.4 By exercising free movement rights,
workers and businesses can relocate the connecting factor and thus change the
applicable law. AFMB demonstrates that this can be intentional. More often,
regulatory mobility is an incidental effect of, rather than a motive for, physical
mobility. The article begins with a first analysis of the extent to which the
main conflict rules of Regulation 883/2004 enable an indirect choice of law.5
The lex loci laboris (section 2) is much less conducive to law shopping than its
alternatives, the posting rule (section 3) and the rule for those who normally
work in two or more States (section 4).
Second, when is such private control over public law problematic? On the
one hand, the free movement rights that, when exercised, influence the
applicable law are fundamental to the European legal order, and there are good
3. 2019 figures for a single person earning 67% of the average gross wage, available at
<europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/tab/#> (all websites last visited 2 Dec. 2020).
4. Title II of Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems, O.J. 2004,
L 166/1; Case C-345/09, van Delft v. College voor zorgverzekeringen, EU:C:2010:610, paras.
52 and 54.
5. North, “Choice in choice of law”, 3 King’s College Law Journal (1992), 29–48, 30.
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reasons why mobility should be accompanied by a change in legal regime. On
the other hand, some indirect choices of law can detrimentally affect labour
markets, workers, and social security systems. In sections 3 and 4, the article
criticizes the rules for posted workers and employees who normally work in
more than one Member State. These rules allow a worker to be subject to the
social security system of a State with which they have only a tenuous link, and
to be excluded from the social security system of States with which they are
meaningfully connected. Moreover, those conflict rules excessively facilitate
indirect choice of law, to the detriment of workers, competitors, and social
security systems.
Third, how can undesirable forms of law shopping be countered? This
article adds to the literature by identifying and analysing several strategies that
legislatures and courts can and do adopt (section 5). These include the
(re)design of conflict rules, their teleological interpretation, the framing of
law shopping as abuse, and the improvement of the enforcement of and
compliance with EU law. Some recent ECJ judgments hinder law shopping, as
would pending proposals to amend the social security Regulations.
A brief terminological aside before starting: this article borrows the
language of “indirect choice of law” from private international law, and mostly
sticks to “law shopping”. Both are more accurate than “forum shopping”6 and
synonymous to, but more evocative than, “regulatory arbitrage”.7 In EU social
policy and in the vernacular, the phenomenon is also referred to as “social
dumping”.8 That term is too loaded and ambiguous for present purposes. Yet,
this article angles for the attention of readers interested in social dumping and,
more broadly, the balance between the economic and social dimensions of the
EU.
6. “Law shopping” differs from “forum shopping”, even though they are sometimes used
interchangeably (e.g. Case C-20/12, Giersch v. État du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg,
EU:C:2013:411, para 80; Opinion of A.G. Mengozzi in Case C-523/13, Larcher v. Deutsche
Rentenversicherung Bayern Süd, EU:C:2014:2260, para 62) and a forum can be appealing
because of the law it is likely to apply. In private international law, a judge (the forum) can apply
foreign law. Therefore, litigants might indulge not only in law shopping but also in forum
shopping by launching proceedings in the jurisdiction that is most favourable to them. In
matters of social security, courts and administrations only apply their own law (though they can
take foreign law into account). Consequently, to shop for a forum is also to shop for its law.
7. Defined as “the action by which mobile economic actors seek to take advantage of
regulatory differences between jurisdictions in order to reduce costs or to gain an advantage” by
Schammo, “Arbitrage and Abuse of Rights in the EC Legal System”, 14 ELJ (2008), 351–376,
353.
8. Defined e.g. as “the practice, undertaken by self-interested market participants, of
undermining or evading existing social regulations with the aim of gaining a competitive
advantage” by Bernaciak, “Introduction: Social dumping and the EU integration process” in
Bernaciak (Ed.),Market Expansion and Social Dumping in Europe (Routledge, 2015), p. 2.
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2. The lex loci laboris
The first half of this article discusses the extent to which some of the conflict
rules of Regulation 883/2004 do, and should, facilitate or complicate law
shopping. The main conflict rule, the lex loci laboris, subjects workers to the
social security legislation of the Member State in which they currently pursue
their activity.9 Accordingly, workers active in Germany enjoy German social
protection, and they and their employers pay social security contributions at
the German rate.
The lex loci laboris brings about equal treatment in the State of work, and
therefore aligns perfectly with Article 45 TFEU. It ensures that workers have
access to the social security schemes of a State with which they are connected,
as that is where they spend their working time. The lex loci laboris levels the
playing field for employers whose staff is active in one Member State.
Whether undertakings are based in Leipzig or Lithuania, in Germany they
compete on the basis of German law. The lex loci laboris embodies host
regulation and reflects the “regulatory neutrality paradigm”, which aims to
enable inter-firm competition within a market and to protect it from
distortions due to the differences between national legal orders.10 The lex loci
laboris prevents Lithuania from benefiting from its lower contribution rate.
Conversely, it does not incite Germany to question the viability of its higher
rate: Germany does not need to fear an exodus of companies seeking to
circumvent its legislation on the basis of the lex loci laboris, as it is indifferent
to the location of the employer.11 Admittedly, that conflict rule enables an
undertaking to relocate the (near-)entirety of its activities from one Member
State to another and to benefit from the lower social costs prevalent there,
while exporting goods across the EU.12 Such “international social
competition” is inherent in the internal market in the absence of
harmonization.13 The lex loci laboris opposes the much more problematic
“internal social competition”, whereby an undertaking’s staff is active in one
Member State while governed by the law of another Member State.
9. Art. 11(3)(a) Regulation 883/2004.
10. Saydé, “One law, two competitions: An enquiry into the contradictions of free
movement law”, 13 CYELS (2010–2011), 365–413, 379, 386, 388–390.
11. Art. 21 Regulation 987/2009, laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation
883/2004, O.J. 2009, L 284/1.
12. The same is true for services that do not involve the movement of people.
13. See Van Hoek, “Re-embedding the transnational employment relationship:A tale about
the limitations of (EU) law?”, 55 CML Rev. (2018), 449–487, 462; van Overbeeke, Sociale
Concurrentie en Conflictenrecht in het Europees Wegtransport, Unpublished PhD University
of Antwerp, 2018, pp. 29–30.
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3. The posting rule
If the lex loci laboris has merits, it also has limitations. When an employer
sends a worker abroad for short stints, it would shift the applicable law twice
within a brief time span: when they leave and when they return. The employer
and the worker would have to familiarize themselves with foreign law and
abide by the contribution and other duties it imposes, not long before
affiliating again to the initial social security system. This would hinder the
employer’s freedom to provide services and inconvenience all involved for no
good reason. That is why the lex loci laboris is flanked by the posting rule,
which keeps workers sent abroad subject to the laws of the State in which their
employer is established for up to two years.14
Posting is an instance of home regulation15 and regime portability:16 it
enables a company to “export” the laws of its home State (e.g. Lithuania)
while being exempt from the laws of the host State (e.g. Germany). For both
States, it is an exception to the idea that social security law applies in a
territorial fashion: local (German) law is disapplied, while non-local
(Lithuanian) law is applied.17 Posting is a growing phenomenon. Between
2010 and 2018, the annual number of certificates for posting increased by 71
percent to 1.8 million.18 While it is an obligation that such certificates be
requested and issued,19 the gap between theory and practice is assumed to be
sizeable.20
The posting rule grants workers equal treatment, not in the State where they
currently work,21 but in the State of their employer. It benefits employers
established in a State with lower contribution rates than those of the host State
(“low-to-high movements”): for instance, they compete in Germany on the
basis of Lithuanian rules. The regulatory differences between States shape the
14. Art. 12(1) Regulation 883/2004.
15. Saydé, op. cit. supra note 10, 387, 390.
16. In labour law, see e.g. Deakin, “Regulatory competition after Laval”, 10 CYELS
(2007–2008), 581–609.
17. Verschueren, “Cross-border workers in the European internal market: Trojan horses for
Member States’ labour and social security law?”, 24 International Journal of Comparative
Labour Law and Industrial Relations (2008), 167–199, at 185, 187 et seq.
18. De Wispelaere, De Smedt and Pacolet, Posting of workers: Report on A1 Portable
Documents issued in 2018 (Publications Office of the European Union, 2020), p. 27.
19. Arts. 15 and 19, Regulation 987/2009.
20. E.g. Pennings, European Social Security Law, 5th ed. (Intersentia, 2010), p. 107.
21. Joined cases C-49, 50, 52–54 & 68–71/98, Finalarte Sociedade de Construção Civil
Ldª, EU:C:2001:564, paras. 21–23. The Grand Chamber, however, granted a posted worker the
right to equal treatment in the host State in circumstances where his employer did not risk being
negatively affected: Joined Cases C-611 & 612/10, Hudziński v. Agentur für Arbeit Wesel –
Familienkasse and Wawrzyniak v. Agentur für Arbeit Mönchengladbach – Familienkasse,
EU:C:2012:339, paras. 82–84.
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inter-firm competition on the German market, with local businesses at a
disadvantage.
Such internal social competition might also foster competition between
States. Regulatory competition is “a process whereby legal rules are selected
(and de-selected) through competition between decentralized, rule-making
entities”.22 The theory of regulatory competition conceives of law as a product
traded on a market.23 On the demand side, undertakings can choose the law
that suits them best, primarily by voting with their feet.24 On the supply side,
the theory predicts that national rule-makers respond to the legal preferences
expressed through (credible threats of) mobility by adapting their laws so as to
attract, or at least retain, undertakings.
The preconditions for regulatory competition to occur are not always
realized.25 At the very least, it presupposes diversity between rules, the
possibility for undertakings to choose between them, and responsiveness of
rule-makers to such choices. For the present purposes, it suffices to note that
regulatory competition is unlikely if undertakings can only select the
applicable social security law with great difficulty.
The effects of regulatory competition are a subject of debate. The original
theory predicted efficiency, and some argue that it induces a “race to the
top”.26 In relation to social security, the fear is that, if anything, regulatory
competition leads not to optimal laws, but to a “race to the bottom”. The
funding of social security is thought to be “highly vulnerable to the pressures
of international regulatory competition”.27 If firms were to compete on a large
scale in Germany on the basis of less onerous foreign social security law,
pressure might accumulate on Germany to lower (or at least not to raise) its
22. Barnard and Deakin, “Market access and regulatory competition” in Barnard and Scott
(Eds.), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Hart Publishing,
2002), p. 198.
23. For a wide-ranging account with particular attention to conflict rules, see Ribstein and
O’Hara, The Law Market (OUP, 2009); for a recent overview in the context of the EU, see
Costamagna (Ed.), “Special section – Regulatory competition in the EU: Foundations, tools and
implications”, 4 European Papers (2019), 123–250.
24. Given the inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship, workers’
influence over such choices is limited; indirect choices of law are made by undertakings and
reflect their interests.
25. E.g. Barnard, “Social dumping and the race to the bottom: Some lessons for the
European Union from Delaware?”, 25 EL Rev. (2000), 57–78; Rühl, “Regulatory competition”
in Basedow, Rühl, Ferrari and de Miguel Asensio (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Private International
Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017).
26. Tiebout, “A pure theory of local expenditures”, 64 The Journal of Political Economy
(1956), 416–424; Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global
Economy (Harvard University Press, 1995).
27. Scharpf, “Introduction: The problem-solving capacity of multi-level governance”, 4
Journal of European Public Policy (1997), 520–538, 525.
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contribution levels, which would have obvious implications for its benefit
levels. A reduction in German contribution rates would narrow Lithuania’s
competitive edge, unless Lithuania were to follow suit.
Admittedly, this is an oversimplified sketch of a complex and uncertain
process, one which requires close empirical attention.28 Still, one key lesson is
that the easier it is for undertakings to choose the most congenial (i.e.
cheapest) social security system, the more likely it is that regulatory
competition occurs. Another is that such competition, even if it does not
degenerate into a race to the bottom, is likely to put pressure on generous
social security systems. Such an outcome would run counter to national goals
as well as the EU objectives of combating social exclusion and promoting
social justice and protection.29
For the last half century, the posting rule has been associated with law
shopping.30 The following pages probe the limits of that rule with a view to
identifying when it is truly problematic.
3.1. An employer’s perspective: Letterbox companies
The Plum case illustrates a failed attempt to use posting as a vehicle for
indirect choice of law.31 Mr Plum, owner of two German construction
companies, founded a Dutch company, Senator, in order to benefit from the
lower labour costs prevailing in the Netherlands. Senator performed work
only for the two German companies, by posting its employees exclusively to
German construction sites. In the Netherlands, Senator maintained an office,
occupied only by the manager who dealt with correspondence, answered
phone calls, and conducted interviews. Other than purely internal
management, Senator performed all its activities in Germany.
What connection, then, must the employer have with a Member State to
benefit from the posting rule? To start with, it must be established there.32 This
condition does not generally rule out letterbox companies – there was no
doubt that Senator was established in the Netherlands. It is relatively easy to
28. Radaelli, “The puzzle of regulatory competition”, 24 Journal of Public Policy (2004),
1–23.
29. Art. 3(3) TEU.
30. See Règlement n° 24/64 portant modification de l’article 13 du règlement n° 3 et de
l’article 11 du règlement n° 4 (législation applicable aux travailleurs détachés et aux travailleurs
exerçant normalement leur activité dans plusieurs pays), O.J. 1964, 47/746; Opinion of A.G.
Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 35/70, Manpower v. Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de
Strasbourg, EU:C:1970:104, at pages 1264–1265.
31. Case C-404/98, Plum v. Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse Rheinland, Regionaldirektion
Köln, EU:C:2000:607.
32. Art. 14(2) Regulation 987/2009.
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relocate the place of establishment of an undertaking, or to create a new
undertaking or secondary establishment abroad.33
While the initial social security Regulations only required establishment,34
the ECJ raised the necessary level of connection between the employer and the
posting Member State. The posting undertaking must “normally” carry out its
activities in the State in which it is established.35 This is to be understood as
the ordinary performance of substantial activities, other than purely internal
management.36 That is the reason why the ECJ denied Senator the advantage
of the posting regime. Relevant criteria to determine whether that threshold is
reached
“include the place where the undertaking has its seat and administration,
the number of administrative staff working in the Member State in which
it is established and in the other Member State, the place where posted
workers are recruited and the place where the majority of contracts with
clients are concluded, the law applicable to the employment contracts
concluded by the undertaking with its workers, on the one hand, and with
its clients, on the other hand, and the turnover during an appropriately
typical period in each Member State concerned”.37
Further indicators and specifications are laid down in soft law. For instance,
the Member States, sitting in the Administrative Commission for the
Coordination of Social Security Systems, draw attention to “the length of time
an undertaking is established in the posting Member State” and consider that
a “turnover of approximately 25 percent of [the] total turnover in the posting
State could be a sufficient indicator, but [add that] cases where [the] turnover
is under 25 percent would warrant greater scrutiny”.38 While surmountable,
this threshold makes it more difficult for an undertaking to choose the
applicable law simply by setting up shop in a Member State with a congenial
social security system.The original connecting factor, establishment, has been
33. Sørensen, “The fight against letterbox companies in the internal market”, 52 CML Rev.
(2015), 85–117, 86–97.
34. Art. 13(a) Règlement n° 3 concernant la sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants, O.J.
1958, 561.
35. Case 35/70,Manpower, para 16; now Art. 12(1) Regulation 883/2004.
36. Art. 14(2) Regulation 987/2009. See also Case C-784/19, TEAM POWER EUROPE,
pending.
37. Case C-202/97, Fitzwilliam Executive Search v. Bestuur van het Landelijk instituut
sociale verzekeringen, EU:C:2000:75, para 43.
38. Practical guide on the applicable legislation in the European Union (EU), the European
Economic Area (EEA) and in Switzerland (Brussels, 2013), 9.
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tightened over the years. As a result, the fight against letterbox companies as
regards the posting rule compares rather favourably to other areas of EU law.39
3.2. A service recipient’s perspective: Carousels
A second strategy for law shopping is for the service recipient – the
contracting party of the posting employer – to continuously satisfy its staffing
needs with posted workers. In low-to-high movements, the employer’s
reduced labour costs should be reflected in the bill. To maximize this saving,
service recipients might seek to durably outsource work to a succession of
posted workers who hand over after two years.
The first social security Regulations did not rule out carousels of posted
workers.40 The Council closed this loophole by stipulating that a posted
worker cannot replace another posted person.41 The limits of this
non-replacement condition were probed in Alpenrind.42 For several years,
Alpenrind, an Austrian company operating an abattoir, outsourced
meat-cutting to posted workers. They were successively sent by two
Hungarian undertakings: as soon as Alpenrind’s contract with Martin-Meat
came to an end, it was replaced by a contract with Martimpex-Meat that lasted
precisely two years, after which Alpenrind immediately concluded another
contract with Martin-Meat. These Hungarian undertakings seemed to share
staffing and organizational resources. While the referring court found no
evidence of abuse of EU law,43 these are the exact arrangements that
undertakings intent on getting round the non-replacement condition would
put in place. The ECJ prohibited the construction: a worker who replaces a
posted worker cannot themselves be posted, even if they are sent by different
employers. It is irrelevant whether the posting employers have their registered
offices in the same Member State and whether they have organizational or
staff connections. There is prohibited replacement as soon as a service
recipient replaces one posted worker with another. As the referring court
observed, this interpretation of the non-replacement condition makes it harder
to circumvent social security law abusively.44
Nonetheless, that condition remains a weak link in the prevention of law
shopping. While immediate replacement is prohibited, it is unclear how much
39. Sørensen, op. cit. supra note 33.
40. Art. 13(a) Regulation 3/58.
41. Regulation 24/64; now Art. 12(1) Regulation 883/2004.
42. Case C-527/16, Salzburger Gebietskrankenkasse and Bundesminister für Arbeit,
Soziales und Konsumentenschutz v. Alpenrind, EU:C:2018:669.
43. Judgment of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof of 10 Oct. 2018, ECLI:AT:VWGH:2018:
RO2016080013.J00, para 42.
44. Case C-527/16, Alpenrind, para 33.
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time must pass before it is considered that one posted worker no longer
replaces another. The Member States, sitting in the Administrative
Commission, held that two months must elapse between two postings
involving the same worker, employer, service recipient, and State, whilst
permitting derogations in specific circumstances.45 That non-binding46
decision slows down the carousel rather than stopping it, and says nothing
about replacement by different workers or employers. Moreover, the
non-replacement condition is hard to monitor47 and seemingly hardly
monitored.48
3.3. A worker’s perspective: Career-long posting
Whether the posting rule applies or not has a marked effect on the labour costs
of employers and service recipients. But the posted workers themselves have
the greatest stake in the applicable legislation, as it shapes not only their
contribution duties, but also their social protection. Other things being equal,
workers should be subject to the social security system of a State with which
they have a meaningful connection.49 While many posted workers are strongly
connected to the home State, this is a likelihood rather than a certainty.
Little integration is needed before a worker is first posted. The condition
that posted workers are “permanently resident” in the home State has long
been dropped.50 All that is required is that the worker was subject to the
legislation of the home State just before being hired by an employer, who can
immediately post him or her.51 The Administrative Commission suggests that
45. Paragraph 3(c) Decision A2 of the Administrative Commission concerning the
interpretation of Art. 12 of Regulation 883/2004 on the legislation applicable to posted workers
and self-employed workers temporarily working outside the competent State, O.J. 2010, C
106/5.
46. Case 98/80, Romano v. Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité, EU:C:
1981:104.
47. Jorens, “Detachering en sociale zekerheid: Het juridisch kader” in Jorens (Ed.),
Handboek Europese Detachering en Vrij Verkeer van Diensten (die Keure, 2009), pp. 75–77.
48. Biletta, Cabrita and Gerstenberger, “Improving the monitoring of posted workers in the
EU”, (Eurofound Ad Hoc Report 2020), available at <www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default
/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef19054en.pdf>, 16–17. See further infra, section
5.6.
49. Rennuy, “The trilemma of EU social benefits law: Seeing the wood and the trees”, 56
CML Rev. (2019), 1549–1590, 1552–1555.
50. Art. 13(a) Regulation 3/58; Case 19/67, Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank v. van
der Vecht, EU:C:1967:49, at p. 353.
51. Art. 12(1) Regulation 883/2004; Art. 14(1) Regulation 987/2009; Case C-451/17,
Walltopia v. Direktor na Teritorialna direktsia na Natsionalnata agentsia za prihodite—Veliko
Tarnovo, EU:C:2018:861.
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workers recruited in order to be posted should have been subject to the
legislation of the home State for one month before the posting, with shorter
periods being examined on a case-by-case basis.52 As there is no trace of such
a period (yet) in the case law,53 one day might even suffice.54
While posted, it is inevitable that the worker is mostly or entirely absent
from the home State. Although no personal links are necessary during the
posting, the worker ought to be connected to the posting undertaking, which in
turn ought to be connected to the home State. The posting undertaking and the
posted worker must remain bound by “a direct link”.55 The latter must be an
employee of the former and remain under its authority. And, as indicated, the
posting undertaking must ordinarily perform substantial activities in the home
State.
The lack of guarantees of integration before and during the posting is not
compensated afterwards. The longer the posting, the more the worker’s links
with the home State dwindle. If the tie between integration and social
protection is not to be severed, the worker should return to that State within
and for a certain period of time. This idea is poorly captured by Regulation
883/2004. The two-year maximum limits the duration of a single posting
rather than the total time the worker spends outside the home State. The
non-replacement condition bans repeated postings to one service recipient,
but allows one worker to be continuously posted to different service
recipients, certainly if they are based in different Member States.56 As the
Regulation sets no “homecoming” requirement, workers can be posted for
their entire career.
Of course, a worker might have been integrated in the home State before
being posted, might maintain connections with that State while posted, and
might return to work there afterwards. Many posted workers may fit that
description, but these are not legal requirements. A worker who first sets foot
in Portugal on Monday, works a shift for a temporary employment agency on
Tuesday, can be hired by a company on Wednesday and posted without further
ado. This worker can remain affiliated to the Portuguese social security
system for his or her entire career, without ever returning to Portugal.57 The
posting rule allows a near-complete divorce between workers’ integration and
52. Para 1 Decision A2 of the Administrative Commission.
53. Case C-451/17,Walltopia, which admittedly is not entirely conclusive.
54. Jorens, op. cit. supra note 47, pp. 46–49.
55. Case C-202/97, Fitzwilliam, para 24; Art. 12(1) Regulation 883/2004.
56. See further Para 3(a) Decision A2 of the Administrative Commission.
57. It is assumed that a single shift suffices and that reliance on the posting rule would not
be denied on the grounds of abuse of EU law (see infra, section 5.5).
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their social protection. The employment relationship is then uprooted, not
temporarily, but durably.58
Amendments to the social security Regulations are currently being
negotiated. The latest available text is a trilogue compromise that was
narrowly defeated in the Council in March 2019 (hereinafter the “Draft
Regulation”). It would slightly contribute to restoring the nexus between
integration and protection, first, by introducing a minimum period of prior
affiliation for those workers who were recruited with a view to being posted,
so as to reinforce their “link with the social security system of the Member
State of origin”.59 They can be posted only if they have been subject to its
legislation for the three months immediately preceding the start of their job.60
The Draft Regulation would also impose a waiting period between postings: a
worker who has been posted for 24 months would in principle have to wait two
months before he or she can be posted again.61 Both interventions would be
small steps in the right direction, but neither guarantees that posted workers
are meaningfully connected to the competent State.
3.4. The wheat and the chaff
When should opportunities for law shopping be curbed? One theme running
through this section is that conflict rules are problematic when they enable
undertakings to choose the applicable law “on the cheap”. This would be the
case if all it took was to set up a letterbox company or organize a rotation of
posted workers. The benefits of law shopping would far outweigh its cost,
making it an appealing proposition for undertakings. Because of its negative
externalities, law shopping should not be all too easy. Its costs are borne by
third parties: local competitors suffer from unfair competition, which in turn
might affect their staff’s working conditions and employability; and the
circumvented social security system experiences a net shortfall in revenue62
and possibly a downwards pressure. For the posted workers themselves, law
58. On the idea of embedding the employment relationship in the State where the work
habitually takes place, see Van Hoek, op. cit. supra note 13.
59. General Secretariat of the Council, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation 987/2009 laying down
the procedure for implementing Regulation 883/2004 – Analysis of the final compromise text
with a view to agreement, 7698/19 Add 1 Rev 1, recital 16a.
60. Art. 2(8)(a) Draft Regulation, ibid. The Parliament sought to apply this waiting period
to all posted workers (European Parliament, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs,
Report on the proposal for a regulation amending Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of
social security systems and Regulation 987/2009 laying down the procedure for implementing
Regulation 883/2004 (C8-0521/2016, 23 Nov. 2018), Amendment 73).
61. Art. 2(8)(aa) Draft Regulation.
62. Posted workers are likely to be net contributors to welfare budgets.
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shopping tends to entail a trade-off between diminished social protection and
improved employability. Given their inferior bargaining position, they are
unlikely to have much choice in the matter – indeed, that is the very reason
why workers are protected against the consequences of contractually choosing
an unfavourable labour law.63
A second criterion that emerges from the above pages concerns the social
protection of workers rather than the contribution burdens of undertakings.
Ideally, conflict rules would base social protection on the worker’s integration.
Despite commendable efforts against letterbox companies and carousels, EU
law fails to guarantee a modicum of integration of posted workers in the
competent State.
In sum, then, opportunities for law shopping should not be excessive, first,
for the sake of labour markets, workers and social security systems; and,
second, because workers’ social protection should be informed by their
integration. Together, these evaluative criteria help to separate
unobjectionable exercises of free movement rights from undesirable forms of
law shopping.
4. The multi-activity rule
Neither the lex loci laboris nor the posting rule are suited for those who
normally (rather than temporarily) work in two or more States. Article 13 of
Regulation 883/2004 instead provides separate conflict rules for them. As
their use grows – the number of certificates quintupled between 2010 and
201864 – so does the awareness of their potential misuse, which both the last
substantial amendment to Regulation 883/2004 and the Draft Regulation seek
to thwart.65 After some general observations, this section will focus on one of
these conflict rules: Article 13(1)(b)(i) (hereinafter “the multi-activity rule”).
TheCalle case illustrates one issue raised by the conflict rules of Article 13
Regulation 883/2004.66 The question was whether a German retailer
established close to the Danish border ought to pay German or Danish social
security contributions. For at least five years, one of Calle’s employees, Mr
Wandahl, was primarily active in Germany, but also worked in Denmark,
where he lived, for about ten hours each week. The ECJ confirmed that he was
63. Recital 23 and Art. 8 Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual
obligations (Rome I), O.J. 2008, L 177/6.
64. De Wispelaere et al., op. cit. supra note 18, p. 39.
65. Regulation 465/2012 amending Regulation 883/2004 and Regulation 987/2009, O.J.
2012, L 149/4.
66. Case C-425/93, Calle Grenzshop Andresen v. Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse für den
Kreis Schleswig-Flensburg, EU:C:1995:37.
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subject only to Danish law. Given that employers’ contribution rates are
negligible in Denmark and relatively high in Germany, Calle could employ
staff in Germany at lower cost than its competitors. Had Mr Wandahl instead
been subject only to German law, Calle would have been put at a competitive
disadvantage, as its activities in Denmark would have been charged at the
higher German rate.Any attempt to subject a person who normally pursues his
or her activities in two Member States to the laws of one State inevitably
creates a competitive imbalance on the territory of the other State.67
The solution most apt to ensure regulatory neutrality would be to subject a
worker to the legislation of each State as regards the activity pursued there.
The predecessor of Regulation 883/2004 provided such a possibility: in
certain cases, each activity was charged at the local rate.68 But such
concurrent application of several legal orders entailed a high administrative
burden and the risk that social protection would be either excessive or
insufficient.69 Under Regulation 883/2004, only one Member State is
competent and levies contributions on all income, whether earned on its
territory or in another Member State.70 This approach creates room for law
shopping, as it provides that the activities in the non-competent State(s) are
taxed at the rate of the competent State. As a result, undertakings can compete
on a labour market on the basis of foreign law.
Article 13(1) Regulation 883/2004 lays down conflict rules for persons
normally pursuing an activity as an employed person in more than one
Member State. A first rule subjects them to the law of their State of residence
provided they substantially work there. Much more problematic is the conflict
rule for those who do not pursue a substantial part of their activity in their
State of residence. The “multi-activity rule” laid down in Article 13(1)(b)(i)
provides that if these workers are employed by one undertaking, they are
subject to the legislation of the Member State in which it has its registered
office or place of business.71
Strikingly, the multi-activity rule is almost entirely indifferent to the
circumstances of the worker. While workers might work in the State in which
67. This article assumes a difference in contribution rates.
68. Art. 14c(b) Regulation 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to
employed persons and their families moving within the Community, O.J. 1971, L 149/2; Case
C-340/94, de Jaeck v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, EU:C:1997:43, para 40.
69. Rennuy, op. cit. supra note 49, 1582–1583.
70. Art. 13 Regulation 883/2004.
71. The same is true if they have several employers, whose registered offices or places of
business are in the same Member State. If these employers’ registered offices or places of
business are located in different Member States, workers are subject to the legislation of one of
these States or the legislation of their State of residence, depending on circumstances (Art.
13(1)(b)(ii)-(iv) Regulation 883/2004). Much of the criticism developed in the main body of
text also applies to these conflict rules.
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their employer has its registered office or place of business, that is only a
likelihood. It is entirely possible for this conflict rule to subject a worker to the
social security system of a State in which they never have, and never will, set
foot. This is a clear departure from the integration–protection nexus.
Moreover, it sits uneasily with Article 45 TFEU, because it can deprive the
worker of access to the social security schemes of all the Member States in
which he or she works.
Attaching importance exclusively to the circumstances of the employer
intrinsically increases the risk of law shopping, insofar as it renders the place
of the workers’ economic activity irrelevant to the determination of the
applicable legislation. An employer may maintain fully-staffed
establishments in two Member States while paying the contribution rates of a
third. Just like the posting rule, the multi-activity rule is based on home
regulation and regime portability.
This vulnerability to law shopping is compounded by the relative ease with
which the registered office or place of business can be moved. It is defined as
the place “where the essential decisions of the undertaking are adopted and
where the functions of its central administration are carried out”.72 To trigger
the law of a particular Member State, an employer must move its real seat
there, but it is not obliged to perform substantial activities there. The
Commission’s proposal to introduce such a requirement would have hindered
law shopping.73 A slightly different approach emerged from the trilogues. The
Draft Regulation fleshes out the notion of “the registered office or place of
business”, which is to be located on the basis of an overall assessment that
gives due weight to the following criteria: “the turnover, the number of
services rendered by its employees and/or income, the working time
performed in each Member State where the activity is pursued, the places
where general meetings are held, and the habitual nature of the activity
pursued”.74 This welcome attempt to tighten the connecting factor, thus
complicating law shopping, has proved highly divisive: it is said to be one of
the few remaining stumbling blocks for the adoption of the Draft Regulation
and its fate is hard to predict.75
72. Art. 14(5a) Regulation 987/2009.
73. Art. 2(8)(b) Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation 883/2004 on the
coordination of social security systems and Regulation 987/2009 laying down the procedure for
implementing Regulation 883/2004, COM(2016)815final. The Administrative Commission
tries to raise the threshold of the registered office or place of business through soft law (see
Practical guide cited supra note 38, 35–36).
74. Art. 2(8)(b) Draft Regulation.




While posting is the phenomenon most readily associated with law
shopping, the multi-activity rule is even more susceptible to manipulation. A
first difference with posting is that the employer does not have to ordinarily
carry out substantial activities in the competent Member State. Second, while
the two-year limit on posting and the non-replacement condition might be
weak, there are no such constraints on the multi-activity rule. Third, unlike the
posting rule, the multi-activity rule does not require the worker to set foot in
the competent State. Compared to posting, the costs of law shopping seem
lower, as fewer conditions must be fulfilled, and the rewards greater, as there
is no time limit.
Admittedly, the multi-activity rule has redeeming features. It is convenient
for employers, who can apply familiar legislation that is unlikely to switch as
time passes. Many workers are active in the State where their employer has its
place of business or registered office, which then functions as an imperfect
proxy for the place of work. If, and only if, the activities are sufficiently
short-lived to qualify as services, this conflict rule could be seen as an
emanation of the employer’s freedom to provide services on the basis of the
law of its State of establishment. But the multi-activity rule is precisely meant
to apply to activities that are “habitually, that is, as a rule rather than merely
exceptionally or temporarily, exercised on the territory of two or more
Member States”.76 At any rate, none of this compensates for the detriment to
the integration–protection nexus, the free movement of workers, fair
competition, and (if regulatory competition materializes) social security
systems. Why subject persons who work in two States, and possibly reside in
a third State, to the legislation of yet another State, with which they may have
no links and in which their employer carries out no substantial activities?
In conclusion, some of the main conflict rules of the Regulation have
contrasting effects. The lex loci laboris serves regulatory neutrality; the
posting rule and the multi-activity rule facilitate law shopping and regulatory
competition. The lex loci laboris bases workers’ social protection on their
integration; the posting rule and the multi-activity rule allow social protection
and integration to be virtually unrelated. The lex loci laboris makes indirect
choice of law costly, as workers have to relocate their entire professional lives,
while fewer constraints are attached to choices of law through the posting rule
and the multi-activity rule.77 The lex loci laboris incarnates host regulation
and provides for the territorial application of social security law; the posting
rule and the multi-activity rule realize home regulation and derogate from
76. Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case C-189/14, Chain v. Atlanco, EU:C:2015:432, para 56 (our
translation; emphasis added).
77. Saydé on the contrary characterizes the lex loci laboris as a “free” choice of host law
and the posting rule as a “restricted” choice of home law, op. cit. supra note 10, 395–397, 410.
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territoriality. The lex loci laboris entitles workers to equal treatment in the
State in which they work, in line with Article 45 TFEU; the posting rule and
the multi-activity rule disentitle workers from the social security system of at
least one State in which they work, which may be in line with the freedom to
provide services. A normative fault line therefore runs through Regulation
883/2004, pitting the lex loci laboris against its alternatives.
5. Private strategies and public counterstrategies
The remainder of this article looks more broadly at the strategies that private
actors can put in place to influence the applicable legislation, as well as the
actual and potential reactions of public actors.
5.1. Tightening connecting factors
A strategy encountered time and again is the relocation of the connecting
factor. The obvious counter-strategy is to make it harder to relocate by
heightening the requisite connection between a State and workers or
employers. Both evaluative criteria support the tightening of connecting
factors: (i) this ensures that integration and social protection go hand in hand,
and (ii) it increases the costs of law shopping, thus decreasing its appeal and
the risk it poses to workers, competitors and social security systems.
If the posting rule and the multi-activity rule are not to excessively facilitate
law shopping while disconnecting workers’ social protection from their
integration, they ought to be tightened further. The necessary connection
before, after and/or between postings could be raised; or the period of posting
could be shortened, as the European Parliament proposed (in vain).78 As to
the multi-activity rule, a personal tie between the worker and the competent
Member State, be it work or residence, ought to be required. None of this is to
deny that those rules have a valid rationale, which excessive tightening could
impair.
5.2. Softening connecting factors
The softening of connecting factors is a second regulatory technique that
complicates law shopping. Posting by letterbox companies could have been
avoided by requiring that a certain percentage of the employer’s turnover be
realized in the home State. Such a precise rule would have enabled
undertakings to organize their business so that they just reach the threshold.
78. European Parliament, Report cited supra note 60, Amendment 73.
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Regulation 987/2009 instead requires undertakings to ordinarily perform
substantial activities in the home State. Such a vague standard, which must be
applied taking into account “all the criteria characterizing the activities”,79
incites undertakings wishing to post workers to err on the side of safety.
Vagueness also opens up space for administrations and courts to counter law
shopping without needing to bend the letter of the Regulations. There is a
correlation between the ease in evading a rule and its precision.
“Circumvention in many cases thrives on detailed rules, making use of the
more textual – albeit seldom purpose-oriented – interpretations of applicable
legal norms.”80 The more legal certainty, the greater the potential for abuse.81
Whether the connecting factors of Regulation 883/2004 ought to be
softened, is a difficult discussion that should engage with the enduring debate
on the relative virtues of certainty (criticized as being rigid) and flexibility
(criticized as being vague).82 Vague connecting factors compromise legal
certainty and hinder the uniform interpretation and application of EU law. As
a result, they increase the risk that more than one Member State considers
itself competent and levies contributions, imposing a double burden on
employers and workers. This article does not intend indiscriminately to
recommend vagueness, but rather to flag up one of its qualities that has so far
been overlooked in the literature on EU social security law: it complicates law
shopping.83
5.3. Favouring the lex loci laboris
Another strategy is to manipulate, not the connecting factor, but rather the
scope of conflict rules: the facts are made to fit whichever conflict rule
designates the sought-after social security legislation. While the lex loci
laboris might occasionally be chosen, undertakings seeking to exploit the
differential in contribution rates are more likely to try to steer clear of that rule,
because it is most apt at levelling the playing field. For instance, an employer
79. Case C-202/97, Fitzwilliam, para 42.
80. Kjellgren, “On the border of abuse –The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
on circumvention, fraud and other misuses of Community law”, (2000) EBLR, 179–194, 179.
81. Saydé,Abuse of EULaw and Regulation of the InternalMarket (Hart Publishing, 2014),
pp. 167 et seq.
82. See e.g. Endicott, “The value of vagueness” in Marmor and Soames (Eds.),
Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (OUP, 2011); Schauer, “The convergence of
rules and standards”, (2003) New Zealand Law Review, 303–328. As regards conflict rules, see
Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: An International Comparative
Analysis (OUP, 2014), Ch. 4.
83. As the ECJ acknowledged in respect of jurisdiction in private international law: Joined
cases C-168 & 169/16, Nogueira v. Crewlink Ireland and Moreno Osacar v. Ryanair
Designated Activity Company, EU:C:2017:688, para 62.
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could instruct its staff living abroad to perform some work at home in a bid to
fall under the rules on multi-activity rather than the lex loci laboris. In order to
complicate such manoeuvres, the EU legislature decided that marginal
activities are to be disregarded in such cases.84
In general, attempts at circumnavigating the lex loci laboris can be
countered by firmly establishing its primacy and narrowing the scope of its
alternatives. At first sight, the EU institutions do just that. The EU legislature
describes the lex loci laboris as the “general rule”, from which it can be
“necessary to derogate” “[i]n specific situations”.85 The ECJ has long
considered the posting rule and the conflict rules on multi-activity to be
exceptions.86 More recently, it explicitly held that, as a derogation, the posting
rule is to be interpreted strictly.87
Upon closer inspection, the institutions’ record is rather more mixed.
Insofar as the EU legislature can take credit for most conditions attached to the
posting rule and the multi-activity rule, this article argued above that further
conditions would be welcome. In a number of cases, the ECJ has narrowed the
scope of those conflict rules, mostly without mentioning law shopping or
related concepts.88 In others cases, however, the ECJ has broadened their
scope at the expense of the lex loci laboris.89 The ECJ’s express statement that
the posting rule ought to be interpreted narrowly might foreshadow a renewed
fondness for the lex loci laboris.90
Not only the scope of the alternatives to the lex loci laboris, but also their
number matters. The opportunities for law shopping increase with the number
84. Art. 14(5b) Regulation 987/2009; Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation
883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems and Regulation 987/2009 laying down
the procedure for implementing Regulation 883/2004, COM(2010)794 final, p. 9.
85. Recitals 17 and 18 Regulation 883/2004.
86. E.g. Case 19/67, van der Vecht, at p. 353 (on Regulation 3/58); Case C-404/98, Plum,
paras. 14–15 (on Regulation 1408/71).
87. Case C-527/16, Alpenrind, para 95 (on Regulation 883/2004, contradicting Opinion of
A.G. Saugmandsgaard Øe, paras. 85–86). Early signs of such an approach were visible in Case
C-202/97, Fitzwilliam, in particular para 30.
88. E.g. Case 35/70, Manpower, para 16 (introducing the requirement that the posting
employer normally carries out its activities in the home State); Case C-202/97, Fitzwilliam
(fleshing out the requisite links between the posted worker and the employer, and between the
latter and the home State); Case C-570/15,X v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, EU:C:2017:674
(disregarding merely occasional activities in a second Member State, in part to avoid conflict
rules being circumvented); Case C-527/16, Alpenrind (strengthening the prohibition on
replacement of posted workers).
89. E.g. Case 19/67, van der Vecht, at pp. 353–354 (the requirement in Regulation 3/58 that
posted workers are “normally attached” to their employer does not prevent employers from
hiring workers exclusively in order to post them); Case 35/70,Manpower, para 15 (temporary
employment agencies can post workers).
90. Case C-527/16, Alpenrind, para 95.
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of conflict rules that might designate different Member States. Undertakings
might contrive to fall under whichever conflict rule points to the most
congenial social security system. Because of the sheer number of conflict
rules – no fewer than nine conflict rules on multi-activity91 in addition to the
lex loci laboris and the posting rule – several social security systems are on
offer. If the choice is not to be made by undertakings, the border between each
of these conflict rules ought to be policed effectively.
In summary, the very existence of several conflict rules opens room for
circumvention. The counter-strategy is to favour the lex loci laboris by
limiting the scope and number of derogations. This further strengthens the
case for attaching supplementary conditions to the posting rule and the
multi-activity rule, though care must be taken not to endanger their legitimate
raison d’être by curtailing them excessively.
5.4. Teleological interpretation
The rulings discussed so far have exemplified the role of interpretation in
increasing or decreasing the vulnerability of Regulation 883/2004 to indirect
choice of law. Textual interpretation tends to facilitate law shopping.92 It
enables undertakings to engineer the facts to match a precise and predictable
rule, and it opposes the introduction of conditions to the posting or
multi-activity rule that are not explicit in the Regulation. Whether teleological
interpretation complicates law shopping, depends on the objective(s) pursued.
For instance, a reading of conflict rules in the sole light of the freedom to
provide services would strengthen the employers’ capacity to compete across
the EU on the basis of the law of their home State and to influence the
applicable social security legislation.
The interpretation of the posting rule is primarily (though certainly not
exclusively) steered by its objectives, among which the freedom to provide
services takes pride of place.93 While the importance of teleological
interpretation remains unchanged, the ECJ has recently enriched the telos. In
the 2018 Alpenrind case, it explicitly endorsed a narrow construction of the
posting rule, on the grounds that it derogates from the general rule.94 The ECJ
understood the non-replacement condition as prohibiting replacement even by
different employers. Much as its Advocate General opposed such an
interpretation of the posting rule on the basis of its wording and its objectives,
91. 5 for employed persons, 2 for self-employed persons, and 2 for persons who combine
statuses (Art. 13 Regulation 883/2004).
92. Kjellgren, op. cit. supra note 80, 179.
93. E.g. Case C-202/97, Fitzwilliam, para 28.
94. Case C-527/16, Alpenrind, para 95.
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the ECJ convincingly grounded a reading that complicates law shopping by
emphasizing the objectives of the lex loci laboris rather than the posting rule.
A second teleological shift occurred in the 2020 AFMB case with which
this article opened.95 As the international lorry drivers did not pursue a
substantial part of their activity in the Netherlands, where they resided, the
multi-activity rule subjected them to the laws of the State in which their
employer’s registered office or place of business was located. But who was
their employer? The Cypriot AFMB with whom they had concluded
employment contracts? Or rather the Dutch transport undertakings who had
selected them, who exercised authority over them, who could effectively
dismiss them, and who reimbursed AFMB for their wages? While the
employment contracts named AFMB as the employer, the ECJ held that the
actual performance of contracts takes precedence over contractual terms in
case of discrepancy; social security institutions must pierce the contractual
veil behind which undertakings might try to hide. It defined the employer as
“the entity which actually exercises authority over the worker, which bears, in
reality, the relevant wage costs, and which has the actual power to dismiss that
worker”.96 Accordingly, the ECJ identified the Dutch transport undertakings
as the actual employers and thwarted the attempt to circumvent Dutch social
security law.
The ruling’s main import is the connection the Grand Chamber drew
between the fight against abuse and the objectives of Regulation 883/2004.
The ECJ buttressed its definition of the notion of employer on the basis of the
objectives of both the multi-activity rule and the Regulation as a whole. It
reiterated that Regulation 883/2004 aims to realize free movement and thus
improve the living standards of migrant citizens, while respecting the features
of national social security systems. The multi-activity rule serves these goals
by preventing the complications that the lex loci laboris would entail, and
designates the applicable legislation on the basis of the objective situation of
workers. If the applicable legislation were instead based wholly on formal
considerations such as contractual terms, undertakings could change it
without contributing to the free movement objective. The applicable
legislation would then depend on free choice, whereas it should depend only
on the objective situation of workers. The ECJ proceeded to make a statement
that should reverberate loudly:
“the objective of [Regulations 883/2004 and 1408/71…] might be
undermined if the interpretation adopted of the [concept of employer]
were to make it easier for employers to be able to resort to purely artificial
arrangements in order to exploit the EU legislation with the sole aim of
95. Case C-610/18, AFMB.
96. Ibid., para 61.
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obtaining an advantage from the differences that exist between the
national rules. In particular, such exploitation of that legislation would be
likely to have a ‘race to the bottom’effect on the social security systems of
the Member States and perhaps, ultimately, reduce the level of protection
offered by those systems.”97
The ECJ thus made clear its dislike for law shopping, without shying away
from taking a firm stance in the regulatory competition debate. Its ruling also
serves the integration–protection nexus: the drivers had no link to speak of
with Cyprus.
The interpretation of the posting rule and the multi-activity rule is therefore
guided by their own objectives, by the objectives of the lex loci laboris, and by
the wish to counter excessive law shopping. This is no screeching about-turn;
the ECJ has always considered the lex loci laboris as the main conflict rule,
and, whether intentionally or not, it has on occasion complicated law
shopping.98 Still, there is a marked inflection in the ECJ’s tone and approach,
which raises the question of whether some earlier case law facilitating (or at
least not hindering) gain-seeking, purely artificial, arrangements might be
ripe for revision. Teleological interpretation is a tool that can be wielded to
negate all kinds of attempted law shopping.
5.5. Doctrine of abuse of EU law
The above counter-strategies might feel frustratingly roundabout – if the issue
is that EU law is being abused, why not deploy the much-discussed doctrine of
abuse of EU law? The ECJ formulated its test in Emsland-Stärke:
“A finding of an abuse requires, first, a combination of objective
circumstances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid
down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been
achieved. It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the
intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by creating
artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it.”99
The ECJ – controversially – considers the doctrine of abuse to be a general
principle of EU law.100 Even if it permeates the whole of EU law, its shape and
97. Ibid., para 69.
98. See supra, notes 86–88.
99. Case C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, EU:C:2000:695,
paras. 52–53.
100. E.g. Case C-359/16, Criminal proceedings against Altun, EU:C:2018:63, para 49.
Contesting this view: e.g. Arnull, “What is a general principle of EU law?” in de la Feria and
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contours are tailored to the context.101 As regards the social security
Regulations, the ECJ has written about “[t]he principle of prohibition of fraud
and abuse of rights” which entails that “Community law cannot be relied on
for the purposes of abuse or fraud”.102 Yet, these rulings concerned fraud
rather than abuse,103 and in AFMB the Court again stops short of introducing
the doctrine of abuse of EU law in Regulation 883/2004.
While two Advocates General have recently supported the application of
the doctrine of abuse of EU law to counter the evasion of contribution
duties,104 it remains uncertain to what extent, and how, that doctrine – which is
intrinsically uncertain105 – applies to the conflict rules of Regulation
883/2004. At best, it would equip courts with a surgical tool with which they
could deny attempts at law shopping that slipped through the net, outlawing
for instance the everlasting posting of a worker. At worst, it would inject a
dose of arbitrariness in the determination of the applicable legislation,
exacerbating the risk that several Member States deem themselves competent
to levy contributions from the same worker and employer.
Abuse can act not only as a general principle, but also as a lodestar for “a
constructive interpretation of the applicable rules so as to exclude from their
scope circumstances of abuse.”106 At present, that is its main role in EU social
security law. Such anti-abusive interpretation is not strictly bound by the
Emsland-Stärke criteria: it might counter constructions that yield no
regulatory advantage or only yield such a gain unintentionally.
5.6. Enforcement and compliance
This article is more concerned with the substance of the law than its practical
implementation. Yet, it is important to note that both the enforcement of and
Vogenauer (Eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law? (Hart
Publishing, 2011), pp. 18–23; Kamanabrou, “Abuse of law in the context of EU law”, 43 EL
Rev. (2018), 534–548.
101. Opinion of A.G. Bobek in Case C-251/16, Cussens v. Brosman, EU:C:2017:648,
paras. 27–30; de la Feria and Vogenauer, op. cit. supra note 100.
102. Case C-206/94, Brennet AG v. Paletta, EU:C:1996:182, para 24; Case C-359/16,
Altun, para 49.
103. Opinion of A.G. Tesauro in Case C-367/96, Kefalas v. Dimosio, EU:C:1998:41,
footnote 28; Opinion of A.G. Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-359/16, Altun, EU:C:2017:850,
para 49.
104. Opinion of A.G. Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-527/16, Alpenrind, EU:C:2018:52,
para 111; Opinion of A.G. Pikamäe in Case C-610/18, AFMB, EU:C:2019:1010, paras. 72–84.
105. E.g. Vogenauer, “The prohibition of abuse of law: An emerging general principle of
EU law” in de la Feria and Vogenauer, op. cit. supra note 100, pp. 545–546, p. 569.
106. Poiares Maduro, “Foreword” in de la Feria and Vogenauer, op. cit. supra note 100, vii.
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the compliance with the Regulation’s conflict rules are found wanting.107 The
social security institution of the home State should perform “a proper
assessment of the facts” before issuing a certificate confirming that the
worker is posted, which binds the social security institutions and courts of
other Member States.108 Yet, it regularly fails to carry out even the most
cursory of checks.109 This deficient administrative enforcement is all the more
problematic because posting certificates can only be challenged in the courts
of the State that issued them: it might not be feasible for workers and the social
security institutions of the host State to sue in the home State in order to obtain
the benefits and contributions that are their due.110 The low likelihood of
litigation and lax administrative enforcement make it relatively improbable
that breaches of the Regulation’s conflict rules (whether intentional fraud or
unintentional error) are noticed, let alone remedied. This in turn enhances the
opportunities for law shopping. None of this has escaped the attention of the
EU legislature, which seeks to improve administrative enforcement.111
6. Conclusion
This article offers the first comprehensive analysis and evaluation of private
strategies and public counter-strategies relating to indirect choice of
social security law. It shows how and to what extent undertakings in the EU
can exert control over the applicable law. The degree of private control over
public law is high when undertakings can choose between a significant
number of jurisdictions at low cost, and vice versa. While doctrinal work can
identify vulnerabilities, empirical studies should shed further light on their
exploitation.
Positive harmonization is a powerful antidote to law shopping: to reduce the
differences between legal orders is to reduce the regulatory gain that
exercising free movement rights can yield. But the prospect of meaningful
harmonization of social security contribution rates is remote at best.112
107. As regards posting, see Rennuy, “Posting of workers: Enforcement, compliance, and
reform”, 22 EJSS (2020), 212–234.
108. Case C-202/97, Fitzwilliam, in particular para 51; Case C-2/05, Rijksdienst voor
Sociale Zekerheid v. Herbosch Kiere, EU:C:2006:69.
109. Rennuy, op. cit. supra note 107, 219.
110. Only some certificates that are fraudulently obtained or relied upon can be challenged
in the courts of both States. Case C-359/16, Altun; Joined cases C-370/17 & C-37/18,
CRPNPAC v. Vueling Airlines and Vueling Airlines v. Poignant, EU:C:2020:260.
111. Regulation 2019/1149 establishing a European Labour Authority, O.J. 2019, L 186/21;
Draft Regulation.
112. Even the most ambitious versions of the European unemployment benefits system
being considered in the Eurozone would not palpably diminish the differences between
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Nonetheless, the regulatory toolbox to counter law shopping is reasonably
well stocked. The EU legislature and the ECJ can tighten and soften
connecting factors, as well as favouring the lex loci laboris. The ECJ, national
courts and social security institutions can counter excessive law shopping
through teleological interpretation and possibly the doctrine of abuse of EU
law. The improvement of the enforcement of and compliance with EU conflict
rules is the shared responsibility of the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches at EU and national levels. To evaluate whether a conflict rule’s
susceptibility to law shopping is excessive, this article complemented the
familiar concern for labour markets and social security systems with a second
evaluative criterion about the worker’s connection to the competent State.
A key finding is that a normative fault line runs through Regulation
883/2004. The lex loci laboris embodies host regulation; implements Article
45 TFEU; aligns with the regulatory neutrality paradigm; complicates law
shopping; and links social protection to integration. The opposite applies to
the posting rule and the multi-activity rule. While those rules can be used
entirely innocuously, they fail to rule out undesirable forms of indirect choice
of law. The lack of necessary safeguards enables undertakings to select and
deselect law that is in fact meant to be mandatory with relative ease, even
though such constructions have negative externalities for workers, labour
markets, and social security systems. In addition, the multi-activity rule and
the posting rule fail to connect workers’ social protection with their
integration, and may well subject them to the social security system of States
in which they have never or barely set foot.
Through the lens of the two evaluative criteria, it is possible to see the
priorities of the EU legislature and the ECJ. Although the overall picture is
messy, both seem to have taken a somewhat dimmer view of social security
law shopping in recent years. If confirmed, this evolution would be congruent
with several trends. Where Alpenrind and AFMB hinder the exit of net
contributors to the welfare budget, Dano hinders the entrance of net
beneficiaries (among others).113 There is a growing focus on enforcement and
compliance across EU social law,114 and a somewhat whetted appetite for
subjecting posted workers to the laws of the host State.115
Member States’ social security contribution rates for employers. Beblavý and Lenaerts,
Feasibility and AddedValue of a European Unemployment Benefits Scheme (CEPS, 2017), pp.
20–21.
113. Case C-333/13, Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, EU:C:2014:2358.
114. E.g. Directive 2014/54 on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on
workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers, O.J. 2014, L 128/8; Directive
2014/67 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71, O.J. 2014, L 159/11; Regulation 2019/1149.
115. Directive 2018/957 amending Directive 96/71, O.J. 2018, L 173/16.
Social security 37
Ultimately, the issue of shopping for social security law ought to inform
neighbouring debates. The discussion on the effects of social policy on
inter-firm and regulatory competition centres on labour law, even though two
of its features that social security law lacks – its partial harmonization and the
routine cumulative application of the labour law of several Member States to
one transnational employment relationship – complicate law shopping.116 In
the final analysis, the topic of this article is a much-overlooked facet of the
debate on the calibration of the economic and social dimensions of European
integration. It speaks directly to the elusive balance between free movement
rights and the protection offered by welfare States in a “social market
economy”.117
116. Art. 8 Rome I Regulation; Directive 96/71 concerning the posting of workers in the
framework of the provision of services, O.J. 1997, L 18/1; Saydé, op. cit. supra note 10,
391–393. For rather rare examples of studies bridging those doctrinal divides, see e.g. Van
Hoek, op. cit. supra note 13; Verschueren, op. cit. supra note 17.
117. Art. 3(3) TEU.
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